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Confidences Worth Keeping:
Rebalancing Legitimate Interests in
Litigants' Private Information in an
Era of Open-Access Courts
Jeffrey W. Sheehan*
ABSTRACT

The ideal of the public trial in open court continues to guide
decisions about public access to courts and their records, even as cases
are increasinglydecided "on the papers." This is still the case when those
"papers" take the form of electronic documents that can be uploaded,
downloaded, copied, and distributed by anyone with an internet
connection. A series of opinions from the US Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reinforcing this ideal of public access to court records and
unsealing district court filings offers an opening to reconsider core
values that must inform our treatment of private information in public
litigation. This Article articulates some of those relevant values and
proposes an orderly mechanism for minimizing gratuitous exposure of
private information while maintainingappropriatepublic access to the
evidence courts use to resolve cases and controversies.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"Throughout our history, the open courtroom has been a
fundamental feature of the American judicial system."' But some
things are private. Those things might be "secret," "confidential,"
"privileged," "proprietary," "embarrassing," or just "none of our
business." Routine pretrial discovery mechanisms, however, expose
massive-and still increasing-quantities of this private information to
In theory, shared access to the relevant facts
opposing parties.
2 These settlements benefit litigants
settlements.
rational
facilitates
and the courts by resolving most disputes without expensive public
trials. Indeed, the courts could not accommodate public trials for every
case. But when potentially unlimited disclosure of private information
over the internet becomes the price of admission to public courts, that
price can be too high. Some litigants will sacrifice their substantive
rights to protect their private information or will retreat to private
arbitration. 3 Others will use privacy-invading mechanisms of public
litigation to extract private information for nonlitigation purposes.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983).
1.
See Krause v. Rhodes, 671 F.2d 212, 214 (6th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he need for trial
2.
frequently disappears once both sides have a full and complete understanding of the facts."
(quoting Krause v. Rhodes, 390 F. Supp. 1072, 1073 (N.D. Ohio 1975))).
See David S. Ardia, Privacy and Court Records: Online Access and the Loss ofPractical
3.
Obscurity, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1385, 1446-47 (2017) ("Potential litigants who cannot afford ADR
may simply view the privacy costs as too great and decide not to seek resolution in the courts--or
worse, engage in self-help remedies."); Laurie Kratky Dor6, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and
Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 308 (1999);
Nancy S. Marder, From "PracticalObscurity" to Web Disclosure:A New Understandingof Public
Information, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 441, 445 (2009) ("Companies have tried to avoid these threats,
as well as the actual lawsuits, by inserting mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts that
consumers must sign if they want the particular product or service.").
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Courts, counsel, parties, and policy makers must therefore balance the
important benefits stemming from public scrutiny of court proceedings
against the harm done to private parties when their secrets go public.
A renewed interest in enforcing a presumption of full public
access to electronic court records-even in cases that began with an
expectation of some secrecy 4-invites a reassessment of the wisdom of
allowing litigants to file virtually anything disclosed in discovery as a
permanent entry in an increasingly public docket. Certain public
aspects of the courts are foundational, but those public aspects are
limited by competing interests and the ultimate need to credibly resolve
disputes. In that regard, more public access does not necessarily
produce better or more credible adjudications, and it is particularly
counterproductive to penalize litigants who disclose private information
in reliance of court orders purporting to protect them from public
disclosure.5 Courts must also consider the related harm to judicial
integrity when courts disclose confidences or allow litigants to disclose
confidences that prior court orders treated as secret. Fortunately,
courts can keep their word, honor the public nature of their institutions,
and protect litigants' privacy while encouraging more efficient use of
truly public court resources by applying modern values of
proportionality and established standards of relevancy and prejudice to
the transition between private discovery and public merits
adjudication.
As explained below, legitimate public interest in parties' private
information extends-at most-to the private information the court
actually considers when adjudicating the merits of a dispute. As such,
narrowing factual disputes protects private information and conserves
public (i.e., court) resources. Stipulations, redactions, substitutions,
and other reasonable alternatives already allow parties to distill private
information to its legally relevant essence. Adapting the party-centered
approach that filters pretrial discovery disputes through formal and
informal negotiations to minimize court involvement could similarly
narrow factual disputes and minimize court exposure to extraneous
private information. Venerable evidentiary rules, along with well-

4.
See, e.g., Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 307 (6th
Cir. 2016) (rejecting arguments based on parties' and third-party hospital and insurers'
expectations).
5.
See In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 478 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[W~e do note
that the bank placed significant reliance upon the protective order. Once placed in this position,
only 'extraordinary circumstances' or 'compelling need' warrant the reversal of a protective order."
(quoting F.D.I.C. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1982))); Dustin B. Benham,
Proportionality,PretrialConfidentiality, and Discovery Sharing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181,
2211 (2014) ("[P]rotective orders supposedly grease the wheels of litigation by ensuring secrecyso long as parties can rely on protective orders being enforced over the long term.").
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practiced discretion when managing discovery and the presentation of
evidence, give district courts everything they need to resolve any
lingering disputes.
Parties and courts should therefore adopt protective orders and
scheduling orders that accommodate full interparty sharing of private
information during discovery and more exacting proportionality
analyses under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(3) before private information flows into an essentially
open-access electronic docket. Some argue that even unfiled discovery
6
should be available to the public or to litigants in other cases, but most
courts recognize that "[s]ecrecy is fine at the discovery stage"' and
simply need to consider how to facilitate the efficient exchange of
voluminous and potentially sensitive discovery material before
winnowing it down to the essential and relevant core. Courts have
sometimes "conflated the standards for entering a protective order
under Rule 26 with the vastly more demanding standards for sealing
off judicial records from public view."8 However, it is possible-and
preferable-to apply each standard to its own domain. Doing so
requires courts to revisit traditional values that informed our current
treatment of private information in public litigation. Courts would then
need to allow those values to dictate what kind of documents belong
under seal, what kind belong in full public view, and what kind have no
business being filed at all.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II identifies and
explores core values that complement and compete with one another in
any public litigation involving private information. Part III explores
unintended consequences of increasing public access without adjusting
other practices, as revealed through a recent series of opinions in the
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reasserting courts' obligations
to enforce certain norms of public access to court records. Part IV
proposes a solution that guards against unjustifiable judicial seals and
disproportionate disclosure of private information, thus keeping public
courts appropriately open to public observers and private litigants.
Part V briefly concludes.

See, e.g., Benham, supra note 5, at 2234-35 (advocating for the adoption of protective
6.
orders with "well-crafted sharing provision[s]," particularly in product liability cases and other
litigation where materials produced in discovery might be useful to similarly situated litigants in
future litigation).
See FED. R. CIv. P. 26; e.g., Shane Group, 825 F.3d at 305 (quoting Baxter Int'l, Inc. v.
7.
Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Shane Group, 825 F.3d at 307.
8.
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II. CORE VALUES
Balancing privacy interests against public access engages core
values, including the right of public access to the courts, the right to
preserve private information from public disclosure, the expectation
that litigants will resolve most pretrial disputes without imposing on
the courts, and the new commitment to keeping broadly defined
discovery costs proportional to the legitimate needs of any particular
case. 9 Those values sometimes complement one another and sometimes
conflict, but any assessment of policies for managing private
information in public litigation benefits from first acknowledging those
values and how they interact. Before deciding who should have access
to what, it is useful to ask: Why?
A. Public Courts
Courts are public, at least in certain respects.
The public
engages with different courts in different ways, but "the open courtroom
has been a fundamental feature of the American judicial system" since
the colonial era, both as a functional component of adjudication and as
an article of civic faith. 10 Public courts serve as "outlets for 'community
concern, hostility, and emotions."' 1 Public access may offer certain
opportunities to "analyze and critique the reasoning of the court[s]" as
they resolve the cases that come before them. 12 Likewise, keeping
courts open to interested and informed individuals directly or through
media may promote "true and accurate fact finding" by inviting critique
of false or incomplete evidence. 13 Whether these benefits improve the
quality of individual decisions or simply preserve public confidence, the
expectation that the public may observe the formal exercise of judicial
power is an essential component of the rule of law.
Courts remain public institutions even when the public takes
little or no interest in a particular case. The US Supreme Court draws

9.
See Marder, supra note 3, at 451 ("[There is a need to return to the purposes behind
making the information public in the first place and to ask whether placing the information on the
Web advances or undermines those purposes.").
10.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983); see
also Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 865 F.3d 661, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("The right
of public access is a fundamental element to the rule of law, important to maintaining the integrity
and legitimacy of an independent Judicial Branch.").
11.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1178 (quoting Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980)).
12.
Id.; see also Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) ("The
operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern.").
13.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1178 (quoting Richmond Newspapers,
448 U.S. at 596).
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a disproportionate share of attention to politically sensitive cases with
national consequences, but those high-profile, highly publicized cases
14
are the exception, even on that court's tiny, idiosyncratic docket. Most
15
cases filed in federal district courts never reach a public trial, much
less a publicized and potentially politicized Supreme Court argument.
Individual district court proceedings and state trial court hearings
retain their essential public quality because anybody could observe
them, not because anyone does.
Typically, when parties physically appear in court before a
But public
judge, the courtroom doors are open to the public.
accessibility does not guarantee public observation. Most litigation
16
Even an interested member of
attracts no apparent public interest.
the public must invest significant effort to place herself in the right
place at the right time to hear anything of interest. Unless a curious
member of the public identifies an interesting case, monitors its
progress, travels to the courthouse, and sits through a hearing, the
details of that "public" hearing remain unknown to the public. So, while
the doors may be open, the people who walk through them are typically
those with active matters before the court.
Even an observer who attends a live hearing does not receive
unfettered access to the proceedings. Conferences conducted in hushed
tones around the bench to keep legal discussions from influencing a jury
Telephonic hearings-often directed at
also exclude the public.

See Adam Feldman, The Biggest Supreme Court Cases of the Term, EMPIRICAL
14.
https://empiricalscotus.com/2016/04/11/biggestcases/
2016),
11,
(Apr.
SCOTUS
[https://perma.cc/DKT7-NW4V]. The Supreme Court reviews approximately one out of every
thousand appellate opinions. See Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the
2010,
Jan./Feb.
LANDSLIDE,
Appeals,
of
Courts
Federal
2
https://americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/intelprop/magazine/LandslideJan 01 0Hofer.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY3A-63YY]. Each year, only a small fraction of this small
fraction of appellate cases breaks through to reach a broad public audience. See Adam Feldman,
Which Supreme Court Cases Are Generatingthe Most Interest?, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://empiricalscotus.com/2019/01/09/most-interest/ [https://perma.cc/C53J-CE9U].
See Table 4.10-U.S. District Courts-Civil Judicial Facts and Figures, ADMIN. OFF.
15.
U.S. CTS. (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data tables/jff_4.10_0930.
2017.pdf
COURTS,

[https://perma.cc/7MR9-9W5W]; CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
(2015),
7
COURTS
STATE
IN
LITIGATION
CIVIL
OF
LANDSCAPE
THE
2

https://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Files/PDF/ResearchlCivilJusticeReport- 015.ashx
[https://perma.cc34H6-Z7S5].
See Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, Silence is Golden: The New Illinois Rules on Attorney
16.
ExtrajudicialSpeech, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 323, 323 (2002); Nicole Hong, Ladies and Gentlemen of
AM),
11:31
2017,
8,
(Dec.
J.
ST.
WALL
Up!,
Please Wake
Jury,
the
https://www.wsj.com/articles/Ladies-and-gentlemen-of-the-jury-please-wake-up-1512750669
[https://perma.cc/W5Z7-NP3M] (detailing difficulties lawyers have maintaining the interest and
attention of jury members). Indeed, as any count of default judgments in small claims courts will
demonstrate, a fair portion of civil litigation fails to attract even the attention of the litigants. The
Author encourages readers who have not recently attended a civil trial to spend a morning visiting
their local court with jurisdiction over car accidents, dog bites, and residential lease disputes.
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discovery disputes or other nondispositive matters-are neither
broadcast over loudspeakers, nor recorded, nor transcribed for public
consumption. Case management discussions in chambers and judicial
settlement conferences occur behind closed doors. Observers are not
invited to question witnesses. They are not entitled to review bench
briefs prepared by the judge's clerks or notes passed among counsel.
They have no claim to the judge's private impressions of the merits of a
case unless those impressions issue in a judicial opinion. Hearings are
public, but many details remain private.
Each of these deviations from full public access reflects a
decision to prioritize some other value over absolute public access. For
example, if unfettered public scrutiny were indispensable for resolving
evidentiary disputes, the court could remove the jury during those
arguments instead of gathering attorneys for quiet conferences around
the bench. Telephonic hearings could use publicly accessible conference
lines or speaker phones in open court. Judges could release their clerks'
memoranda in real time or publish early drafts of major decisions.
Legislatures could try to compel similar disclosures.1 7 For various
reasons-efficiency, candor, comfort, or convenience-the courts and
other policy makers draw lines that invite the public to witness parts of
the proceedings while sometimes keeping the public at a distance.
Analyses of the proper quality and quantity of public access at
various phases of litigation often apply the same principles to the live
proceedings and the pleadings,18 but the ephemeral live hearing and the
fixed written record leave room for meaningful contrasts, even before
accounting for differences between paper and electronic or online
records. The public observers of a public hearing must engage in a
reciprocally public act by appearing in court. Judges, lawyers, parties,
and witnesses may or may not recognize spectators in the courtroom,
but they know whether they are alone. 19

17.
See Justin Walker & Caroline Phelps, Chilled Chambers: ConstitutionalImplications
of RequiringFederal Judges to Disclose Their Papers Upon Retirement, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 1169,
1174-76 (2017) (describing various approaches to disclosure of judicial papers); Kathryn A. Watts,
Judges and Their Papers, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1665, 1714-20 (2013) (evaluating congressional
authority to impose disclosure requirements on federal judges).
18.
See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1177 ("Basic principles have
emerged to guide judicial discretion respecting public access to judicial proceedings. These
principles apply as well to the determination of whether to permit access to information contained
in court documents because court records often provide important, sometimes the only, bases or
explanations of a court's decision.").
19.
The situation is more complicated, perhaps, in the jurisdictions that allow video or
audio recording or streaming in the courts. See Mitchell Galloway, Note, The States Have Spoken:
Allow Expanded Media Coverage of the Federal Courts, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 377, 806-08
(2019).
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Pleadings and other filings are qualitatively different. A docket
entry is forever, 20 and the party that files a document with the court or
has its private information filed by someone else has no way of knowing
if or when the public will arrive to claim access. Some of the same
practical and bureaucratic barriers limit casual public access to paper
records, 2 1 but the open-ended possibility of future access distinguishes
written filings from live testimony and advocacy.
Electronic judicial records take us a step further from the open
courtroom.

22

23
As electronic records become increasingly accessible,

reduced costs of access to these electronic records increase the
likelihood that policies calibrated for live testimony or paper records
will result in electronic overdisclosure in some cases. 2 4 Historically,
practical barriers separated public electronic filings from public
scrutiny in ways that roughly mirrored the obstacles that limited casual
access to paper files. For ten cents a page, anyone with a Public Access
to Court Electronic Records (PACER) account can locate and collect the
2 5
public filings of any recent federal case, but the dimes add up.
Further, an interested party still must register for PACER and identify
an interesting case. Like the "whitepages" telephone directories and
library card catalogues typical during its 1980s origins, PACER allows
people to search one court at a time using party names and case
numbers, but not topics or issues. 26 After finding the case, a PACER
user can review docket entries and download the individual filings,
27
paying at each step for the search results and documents reviewed.

See Karen Eltis, The Judicial System in the Digital Age: Revisiting the Relationship
20.
Between Privacy and Accessibility in the Cyber Context, 56 MCGILL L.J. 289, 316 (2011) (describing
litigants' reasonable "fears of having intimate details exposed not only in dusty court files but
online, easily googled by potential employers, landlords, even suitors, and so forth").
CTS.,
ST.
TENN.
History,
Case
Public
e.g.,
See,
21.
https://www.tncourts.gov/courts/supreme-court/public-case-history [https://perma.cc/5Z2E-UCJ5]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
See Justin Hughes, The Internet and the Persistenceof Law, 44 B.C. L. REV. 359, 37122.
72 (2003) (describing tensions in "translating real world laws, so that the balance they draw in the
real world would be roughly replicated in cyberspace").
See Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and
23.
Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 314-15 (2004).
See Eltis, supra note 20, at 302-06 ( "'[A]ccess' may no longer serve the rationales of
24.
openness and accountability and instead undermines the very entry to justice it was intended to
foster."); Winn, supra note 23, at 315 ("In this context, to assert that electronic judicial records
should be placed under the same rules as paper records is nothing more than to advocate for the
free flow of information at the expense of the many other competing values.").
25.

See

PUB.

ACCESS

TO

CT.

ELEC.

RECORDS,

https://www.pacer.gov

[https://perma.cc/BC23-3X8L] (last visited Feb. 26, 2019).
26.

See PUB. ACCESS TO CT. ELEC. RECORDS, PACER USER MANUAL FOR CM/ECF COURTS

17-23 (2017), https://www.pacer.gov/documents/pacermanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5HB-J4PZ].
See Julie L. Kimbrough & Laura N. Gasaway, Publication of Government-Funded
27.
Research, Open Access, and the Public Interest, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 267, 277 (2016);

2019]

CONFIDENCES WORTH KEEPING

913

While PACER's costs and narrow functionality translate some of
the inconvenience of attending a live hearing in a secure courthouse to
the electronic docket, those barriers are eroding. 28 For instance, the
judiciary 29 and the legislature 30 have considered reducing or
eliminating PACER fees. More importantly, as costs for data storage
decrease and data-science capabilities improve, private companies like
Westlaw and Lexis have started to gather and analyze those public
filings, searching for valuable insights into the process and the relevant
participants in litigation. 3 1
That comprehensive interest is
qualitatively different from the attention paid by the press or other
intermediaries between public courts and the broader public, even for
the most sensationalized Supreme Court cases. 3 2 The loss of those
barriers further undermines confidence that the old rules for paper
records properly balance the real costs and benefits of increasingly
accessible electronic records. 33
Legal research services have long provided access to filings from
individual cases, but they are developing ever more detailed analyses
in which the underlying filings are simply raw material.
These
research services download every filing 34 to analyze the data for what it
Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/electronic-public-access-fee-schedule
[https://perma.cc/25GF-VMQZ].
28.
See Marder, supra note 3, at 442 ("When documents that were previously available
only by making a trip to the courthouse or an agency are now available online, what was practically
obscure is now glaringly public.").
29.
See, e.g., Brief of Retired Federal Judges as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 4, Nat'l Veterans Legal Servs. Program v. United States, No. 19-1081 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 23, 2019),
ECF No. 26 ("The best policy is to make PACER free.").
30.
See Jason Tashea, ProposedLegislation Would Eliminate Pacer Fees, AM. BAR ASS'N
J. (Sept. 18, 2018, 10:55 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new-bill wants to end
pacerfees [https://perma.cc/U78E-KCZ4].
31.
See Thompson Reuters Westlaw Edge: Litigation Analytics Coverage, THOMPSON
REUTERS, https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/content/damlewp-m/documents/legallen/pdf/other/
final -s071146.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YYT-M9GY] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); What We Do, LEX
MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/what-we-do/ [https://perma.cc/7JFQ-3C58] (last visited Mar. 14,
2019).
32.
Take a moment and search for news coverage of your favorite (or least favorite)
Supreme Court opinion from last term. Great coverage might link to the underlying court of
appeals opinion. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,
SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/masterpiece-cakeshop-1td-v-coloradocivil-rights-commn/ [https://perma.cc/C4D2-BM48] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). The PACER
records currently being harvested by LexMachina and WestLawEdge provide access to every
unsealed docket entry in the underlying district court case, not only for the nationally known
Supreme Court case, but also for the next obscure case on that district court's docket. See
Thompson Reuters Westlaw Edge: LitigationAnalytics Coverage, supra note 31.
33.
See Lyria Bennett Moses, Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change?, 8
MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 589, 594-95 (2007).
34.
See How It Works, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/what-we-do/how-it-works/
[https://perma.ccZQH9-KMXR] (last visited Mar. 14, 2019). The most advanced and
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says about judges, attorneys, and parties, to sell that insight to
35
subscribers in a modern search and analysis platform. Litigants value
the analysis that helps determine whether a motion is worth filing,
whether a case is likely to resolve ahead of some privately relevant
deadline, or even what lines of argument have been persuasive in a
particular court on a particular issue. As law firms, repeat litigants,
litigation finance companies, and others continue to explore the
substantial economic value of this trove of information in litigation, the
filings themselves will become increasingly accessible as well.
A LexMachina or Westlaw Edge search resembles a PACER
search in roughly the same way that a Google search resembles a search
using your local library's card catalogue.3 6 It has almost nothing in
common with pre-internet searches for court filings in individual clerks'
offices. This mirrors the kind of aggregation that made a "vast
difference" for Justice John Paul Stevens when comparing "public
records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files,
county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of
information." 37 Instead of requiring massive investments of FBI
resources to pull and review data for each FBI rap sheet, modern
searches are instant, comprehensive, and impose almost no marginal
cost. Although those searches currently require subscriptions to
commercial research services, strong arguments in favor of full public
access may ultimately succeed not only in "mak[ing] PACER free," but
also in facilitating more powerful public searches to meet public
expectations.38
This nascent practice of aggregating and performing automated
analysis of every page filed in every case in an increasing number of
courts requires a reassessment of the goals and costs associated with
the public access we allow to court documents. 39 Big data analyses of
individual courts' and judges' tendencies in resolving certain kinds of
disputeS 4 0 offer new and objective ways to "analyze and critique" those
comprehensive systems are still catching up on historical backlogs, but they report collecting
documents from all federal district courts. See Thompson Reuters Westlaw Edge: Litigation
Analytics Coverage, supra note 31.
See What We Do, supra note 31.
35.
See Brief of Retired Federal Judges as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra
36.
note 29, at 7 (drawing similar comparisons to card catalogues and modern internet search engines).
U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764
37.
(1989).
See Brief of Retired Federal Judges as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra
38.
note 29, at 4, 7.
See Ardia, supra note 3, at 1452 ("Until recently, we have been able to rely on the
39.
obscurity of court records to protect privacy interests, but we can no longer do so.").

40.

See How It Works, supra note 34.
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decisions, not only to advance litigants' goals in individual cases, but
also to advance the core goals associated with public critique of the
courts' exercise of judicial authority.4 1 Given the retirement of Justice
Anthony Kennedy, 4 2 the polarization of the major political parties,4 3 the
increasing attacks on judicial independence, 4 4 and the recent practice
of confirming nominees without honoring blue slip traditions" 5 or
considering ABA assessments of professional qualifications,4 6 this easy
access to some objective data may prove valuable for understanding the
independence and quality of the federal judiciary. But it will not be
free.4 7

B. Respect for PrivateInformation
The second core value-respect for private information-stands
in tension with the value of public courts. However, the two values are
not entirely at odds with one another. Some cases may involve little
private information, but "[p]rivacy can be a matter of concern to the

41.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983).
42.
See Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-retiresupreme-court.html [https://perma.cclRBV8-QKDH]. Increased scrutiny of judicial philosophy by
political actors before nominations and increased homogeneity of views within each of the major
political parties left Justice Kennedy as the last idiosyncratic median Justice on the Court. See
Carl Hulse, Political PolarizationTakes Hold of the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/us/politics/political-polarization-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/9X93-AHLT]. Future appointments seem likely to add to predictable votes in
favor of the nominating party's core values. See id.
43.
See Political Polarization, 1994-2017, PEw RES. CTR. (Oct. 20, 2017),
http://www.people-press.org/interactives/political-polarization- 1994-2017/
[https://perma.cc/F2BX-CCBP].
44.
See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2018, 12:51 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1065346909362143232?lang=en [https://perma.cc/
Z4ZA-ZEK5].
45.
Traditionally, a judicial nomination would not advance through the Senate until the
nominee's home-state senators indicated their support by returning a blue slip of paper to the
Senate Judiciary Committee Chair. See The Blue Slip Tradition, AM. CONST. SOC'Y,
https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/The-Blue-Slip-Tradition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VA6-CNS4] (last visited Mar. 30, 2019). For more on the recent erosion of this
tradition, see Jordain Carney, Senate Confirms Trump Court Pick Despite Missing Two 'Blue
Slips', HILL (Feb. 26, 2019, 6:04 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/431717-senateconfirms-trump-court-nominee-despite-missing-two-blue-slips [https://perma.cc/JT3N-FVQW].
46.
See Statement of ABA PresidentLinda A. Klein Re: ABA's Role in Screening Judicial
Nominations, AM. BAR ASS'N (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/abanews-archives/2017/03/statement of abaprel/ [https://perma.cc/2NEF-2KRZ].
47.

Cf. MIGUEL DE FIGUEIREDO ET AL., AGAINST JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: EVIDENCE

FROM THE SIX MONTH LIST 4, 6 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2989777 [https://perma.cc/5GZ9QA7F] (exploring non-financial costs associated with publishing the Civil Justice Reform Act
listings of long pending civil action and civil motions).
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48
plaintiff, the defendant, and nonparties in a wide array of lawsuits."

A significant portion of constitutional and statutory law involves
protecting private control over property, information, and other
49
penumbrae of private agency against governmental intrusion. These
protections extend to various discrete categories of information
5 0 educational
including, for example, private health information,
52
records,5 1 economically valuable trade secrets, confidential business
information, and information that could undermine national security (a
confidential public good). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure extend
lesser protections to other information that would simply embarrass a
litigant or third party. 53 Different types of information receive different
protections in different situations, but every public trial and every
public filing comes with a cost that can be measured by the private
information it discloses.
Public trials require some element of public disclosure, but
pretrial discovery does not. 5 4 The pretrial discovery process was
designed and expanded to foster private resolution of conflicts, with "no
intention of . .. undermin[ing] privacy" or "promoting public access to
The parties' default rights to privacy prior to
information."5 5
adjudication are maximal, and those rights only need to be balanced
against default rules of public adjudication once the private information
becomes necessary for that adjudication.
Entire bodies of law deal with repeated patterns of conflict
56 State interests in
between beneficial privacy and public adjudication.
law enforcement or general security provide obvious examples of
protected privacy interests. Grand juries proceed in secret to protect
the witnesses, the investigation, and the accused. National security
57
concerns permit closing courtrooms and sealing judicial records.

Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts,
48.
105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 464 (1991).
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. III, IV, V, XIV; Health Insurance Portability and
49.
Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2018).
See § 1320d-6; 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2016).
50.
See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2018); 34 C.F.R. §
51.
99.1 (2000); United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 802-03 (6th Cir. 2002).
See Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2018).
52.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)-(d), 26(c)(1).
53.
See Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir.
54.
2016) ("Secrecy is fine at the discovery stage. . . ."); Romero v. Drummond Co., 480 F.3d 1234, 1245
(11th Cir. 2007) ("The right of access does not apply to discovery. . . .").
Miller, supra note 48, at 466 (citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 396
55.
(1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
See ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALING COURT RECORDS AND
56.
PROCEEDINGS: A POCKET GUIDE 5-16 (2010).

57.

See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983).
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Other protected privacy interests cluster around deeply personal
information.5 8 Those protections are standardized and clearly defined,
for example, for personal medical information protected under the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 59
Similar protections cover educational records through the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). 60 They also reach
financial details and personal identifiers that might facilitate identity
theft or similar abuse. 61 More general policies against unnecessary
exposure of private information inform rules of evidence 62 and
discovery,6 3 as well as attorneys' professional obligations. 64 These
safeguards against unnecessary disclosure give litigants and district
courts the responsibility and discretion, both as a matter of efficiency
and of fairness, to keep marginally relevant private information away
from juries and away from the public.
While a real tension exists between public courts and private
information, respect for privacy is also integral to the important values
of keeping the courts open to all litigants and securing cooperation from
third parties with information relevant to a dispute. Civil litigation is
voluntary-to some degree-so some respect for private information is
a prerequisite to functional public courts. For institutions defined by
individual "Cases" or "Controversies," 65 rather than abstract curiosity,
closing the courts to parties that value private information is a problem.
Remember, courts are public because being public helps them fulfill
their constitutional role, not because the public is entitled to irrelevant
details beyond the margins of the cases or controversies adjudicated. 66
While litigation over judicial seals necessarily focuses on the litigants
who go to court and the observers asserting their actual interest in the
documents as a public interest, 67 the void left by parties who forfeit legal

58.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 5.2.
59.
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 221,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
60.
See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 1232g, 88 Stat.
57 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012)).
61.
See Winn, supra note 23, at 318.
62.
See FED. R. EVID. 403, 412.
63.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
64.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
65.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
66.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; id. amend. XI; Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight
Council, 865 F.3d 661, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2017); supra Part II.A.
67.
See Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 304-06 (6th Cir.
2016); Julie E. Zink, When Trade Secrecy Goes Too Far:Public Health and Safety Should Trump
Corporate Profits, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1135, 1169-71 (2018) (focusing on litigation's
inadequacies as a mechanism for publicizing trade secrets).
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rights or pursue private arbitration to protect peripheral private
68
information also undermines the public nature of the courts.
C. Collaborative, Litigant-DrivenPretrialLitigation
The third core value that informs confidentiality policies for
litigation is the norm of collaborative, litigant-driven pretrial litigation.
When discovery procedures function properly, the court sits in the
background while the lawyers resolve disagreements over the scope and
volume of discovery. 69 Lawyers regularly balance the merits and
importance of a discovery request or objection against the costs of
bringing that dispute to the court, costs that include billable hours and
70
the risk of frustrating a judge or losing credibility with the court.
Some discovery disputes require formal or informal judicial
involvement,7 1 but most do not.
Occasional public displays of judicial frustration highlight the
expectation of cooperation and illustrate the possible consequences of
violating that expectation. In one well-publicized example, an order
from the US District Court for the Western District of Texas invited
counsel to a "kindergarten party" to learn "[h]ow to enter into
reasonable agreements" and limit discovery to "reasonable subject
matter." 72 In an email to district judges that leaked "beyond the limited

See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1636 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
68.
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration,a 'Privatizationof the Justice System',
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitrationa-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc/SRY4-FDYC].
See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law
69.
Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1998). But see Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers
Tr. Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996) ("The District Court cannot abdicate its responsibility to
oversee the discovery process and to determine whether filings should be made available to the
public.").
See Matthew Salzwedel, The Motion to Compel: Think Tactically & Keep It Simple,
70.
https://lawyerist.com/motions-to-compel-keep-it-simple/
2017),
27,
(Jan.
LAWYERIST
[https://perma.cc/8QBW-DK3C].
71.

See CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL

JUDICIARY 5-7 (2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf
[https://perma.cclXE4U-5BYK]. Some judges invite or require telephonic conferences with the
parties and the judge about any discovery disputes before filing a discovery motion. See Michael J.
Caputo, How Come You Never Call? Resolving Deposition Disputes by Telephone, DUTY ON THE
https://www.sbw 1p.com/how-come-you-never-call-resolving-deposition-disputes-byBREACH,
telephone/ [https://perma.cc/4G99-VZPU] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). Unsurprisingly, given the
broad discretion extended to magistrate judges and district court judges managing discovery, if a
judge develops and communicates a preliminary assessment of the dispute, the parties and the
court can often avoid the cost and delay of formal briefing and adjudication. See United States
Courts, Civil Rules 2015-Early and Active Case Management, YOUTUBE (Dec. 21, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XqlZeBAFilO [https://perma.cc/QT4A-5CFC].
Order at 1-2, Morris v. Coker, No. A-11-MC-712-SS (W.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2011); see also
72.
David Lat, Benchslap of the Day: Judge Sparks Burns More Attorneys, ABOVE L. (Aug. 29, 2011,
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scope of the intended distribution," Chief Judge Edith Jones of the US
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed that the kindergarten
party order "cast[] more disrespect on the judiciary than on the nowbesmirched reputation of the counsel."7 3
The email and the original order demonstrate two important
points. First, while Chief Judge Jones discouraged the practice of
committing that form of judicial frustration to the public record, she did
not take issue with the frustration itself. While neither Chief Judge
Jones nor anyone else reading the kindergarten party order can say
whether either party or both parties earned a "now-besmirched
reputation," any experienced litigator understands that judges may get
frustrated with both parties when discovery breaks down. 74 Chief
Judge Jones focused her email on the more manageable task of keeping
evidence of judicial frustration that might suggest unfair bias out of the
public record,7 5 but litigants are often more concerned about
undocumented frustration and its potential impact on a case or a
reputation. Whether those frustrations are reduced to a written order
or not, lawyers worry about adversarial relationships between the
parties spilling over into an adversarial relationship with the judge.7 6
The tone and form of "kindergarten party" orders are exceptional, but
judges regularly express the same expectations and similar broadbrush frustration with lawyers who fail to work through routine
discovery disputes,7 7 and any cost-benefit analysis of a minor dispute
over discovery or evidentiary matters should include the risk of losing
credibility with the court.
Second, Chief Judge Jones's understandable concern that her
email to the Fifth Circuit district judges spread online beyond the
"limited scope of the intended distribution" parallels litigants' concerns
about their private information.7 8 The possibility that any document
5:20
PM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2011/08/benchslap-of-the-day-judge-sparks-burns-moreattorneys/ [https://perma.cc/M2DV-ZH6V].
73.
John Council, 5th Circuit Chief Judge Takes U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks to Task
in
an
Email,
TEX.
LAW.
(Sept.
12,
2011,
12:00
AM),
https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/almID/1202514158040&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1/
[https://perma.cc/US8Y-CAJ4]; see also David Lat, Benchslap of the Day: Judge Sparks Gets a
Taste
of
His
Own
Medicine,
ABOVE
L.
(Sept.
13,
2011,
10:19
AM),
https://abovethelaw.com/201 1/09/benchslap-of-the-day-judge-sparks-gets-a-taste-of-his-ownmedicine/ [https://perma.ce/DVV9-CYQ2].
74.
Joe Patrice, Federal Judges Sound Off On Discovery, ABOVE THE LAW (Jan. 26, 2017,
2:16
PM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/01/federal-judges-sound-off-on-discovery/
[https://perma.cc/9QP9-DWES].
75.
See Council, supra note 73; Lat, supra note 73.
76.
See also Lat, supra note 73 (noting that a judge "fighting with counsel ... is surely not
a fair contest" and "suggests bias").
77.
See Patrice, supra note 74.
78.
Lat, supra note 73.
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could take on new life and unlimited distribution on the internet is a
concern litigants weigh when deciding how to respond in discovery and
how to prove their cases in court. 79
D. Proportionality
A fourth core value-proportionality-was critical to the most
80 "Relevancy
recent revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
alone is no longer sufficient" to compel the collection, review,
8 1 Instead, a court
processing, and production of voluminous records.
assessing proportionality will seek "input from both sides" to determine
whether the material is worth the effort in light of the magnitude of the
underlying conflict, the importance of the material, and the costs and
82
burdens associated with providing it for use in the litigation. As a
part of the analysis, the requesting party must "explain the ways in
which the underlying information bears on the issues as that party
understands them" and the objecting party will articulate the "undue
83
burden or expense" associated with producing the information. This
allows the court to determine "whether the burden and expense of the
84
proposed discovery outweigh its likely benefit." This new-or perhaps
not so new 8 5 -concern for proportionality reflects the increasing
quantity, permanence, and accessibility of electronic records.
In theory, proportionality review should cut back on some of the
excesses that resulted from the prior standard authorizing "discovery
of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action" as
long as "the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence." 86 Applying the prior broad standard
to electronic data weaponized discovery and allowed parties to extract
all manner of sensitive data from each other and from third parties
using subpoenas.8 7 Protective orders and mandatory and permissive

See Eltis, supra note 20, at 316.
79.
See In re Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 564-66 (D. Ariz. 2016).
80.
Id. at 564.
81.
Id.
82.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's notes to 2015 amendments.
83.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The court will also "consider[] the importance of the issues at
84.
stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to the relevant
information, the parties' resources, [and] the importance of the discovery in resolving the
Id.
issues.
See Linda Sandstrom Simard, Seeking ProportionalDiscovery: The Beginning of the
85.
End of Procedural Uniformity in Civil Rules, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1919, 1928-30 (2018) (describing
history of proportionality in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (pre-2015 amendments).
86.
See Miller, supra note 48, at 466; William Hopwood, Carl Pacini & George Young,
87.
FightingDiscovery Abuse in Litigation, 6 J. FORENSIC & INVESTIGATIVE AcCT. 52, 52 (2014).
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redactions enabled increasingly intrusive discovery by providing a
theoretical backstop against public disclosure.
Those protections
against full public disclosure allowed courts and litigants to discount
the risk of limited disclosure to adversaries in litigation. So while the
old rules were not designed to undermine privacy, advances in
electronic data storage and changes in business practices
fundamentally altered the records to which they applied, often to the
dissatisfaction of litigants.8 8
In a broader sense, proportionality reflects the pragmatic
constitutional limitations of federal judicial power to the resolution of
true "Cases" or "Controversies"8 9 and the first Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure calling for "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding."90 Although the courts exercise public
power and deserve public scrutiny, the scope of each extends only as far
as is necessary to resolve real disputes between parties. When
resolving those disputes, the courts avoid imposing unnecessary costs
on the parties, and seek to do justice as quickly and as inexpensively as
possible. This requires "the court and the parties" 91 to work within the
scope of their authority and ability to narrow the legal and factual
disputes to their cores and accept and impose judgment only where
agreement is impossible.
III. RENEWED STANDARDS FOR SEALING DOCUMENTS
Depending on which value predominates, judicial seals are a
necessary evil or-more charitably-a pragmatic compromise. It is
neither "speedy" nor "inexpensive"92 to redact everything exchanged in
discovery. It is not "just"9 3 to deprive one party access to potentially
relevant information in the other party's possession or to force full
public disclosure of legitimately private information. So within the
bounds of Rule 26, courts regularly permitted and required disclosure
of party secrets in discovery with the assurance that parties who
received others' secrets using the power of judicial discovery
mechanisms could not disclose them beyond the needs of the litigation.
Unfortunately, once litigants had access to each other's secrets, courts
were not always attentive to issues involving their own access to

88.
See Miller, supra note 48, at 466 (citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 396
(1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
89.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
90.
FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.

922

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 21:4:905

irrelevant but sensitive details in pretrial proceedings when neither the
jury nor any other proxy for the public was present to trigger a
balancing of the public's need for specific details against the costs and
inconvenience of preserving privacy. As a result, particularly as
electronic communications caused an exponential increase in
discoverable material, many courts approved protective orders under
Rule 26 that also allowed parties to protect information from disclosure
94
not only during discovery, but also after filing it in court records. This
turned out to be a problem.
The accessibility of documents on electronic dockets diverged
from their hard-copy antecedents over time, but a sudden change of
practice in the Sixth Circuit threw their differences into sharp contrast.
A series of opinions beginning in 2016 with Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Michigan resulted in a new procedural mechanism
for maintaining open judicial records across the Sixth Circuit and offer
95
a helpful case study for balancing the values discussed above. Shane
Group addressed allegations of price-fixing affecting "millions of
Michigan citizens." 96 Despite the public's "keen and legitimate interest"
in the evidence, the district court "sealed most of the parties'
substantive filings from public view, including nearly 200 exhibits and
an expert report upon which the parties based a settlement
agreement." 97 With substantial portions of the evidence and expert
opinions either redacted or sealed, class members argued that "their
lack of access to the court record impaired their ability to assess the
settlement's fairness." 98 After the district court prevented unnamed
class members and other interested entities from unsealing or accessing
the documents needed to evaluate the settlement, the Sixth Circuit
revisited the standard and imposed additional procedural hurdles for
sealing judicial records. 99
See, e.g., In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 472-73 (6th Cir. 1983).
94.
See generally Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299 (6th
95.
Cir. 2016).
Id. at 302.
96.
Id.; see also id. at 306 ("The documents placed under seal in this case include, among
97.
other things, the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and
Blue Cross's Response, and Blue Cross's motion to strike the report and testimony of the Plaintiffs'
expert witness, Dr. Jeffrey Leitzinger (for whose services, under the settlement agreement, the
class members would pay more than $2 million). And sealed along with the parties' filings were
194 exhibits to them-including Leitziriger's report, whose valuation of the class's claims by all
accounts was the keystone of the settlement agreement.").
Id. at 304.
98.
See id. at 304-06. The concern for overbroad sealing was not unique to the Sixth
99.
Circuit and has been expressed previously in other circuits. See, e.g., Citizens First Nat'l Bank of
Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The order that the district
judge issued in this case is not quite so broad as 'seal whatever you want,' but it is far too broad to
demarcate a set of documents clearly entitled without further inquiry to confidential status.").
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A. Reinforcing Old Norms
As a substantive matter, Shane Group merely reaffirmed a Sixth
Circuit standard articulated in 1983 in Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Corp. v. F.T.C.100

Shane Group reiterated Brown & Williamson's

"strong presumption in favor of openness" in service of the public's
"interest in ascertaining what evidence and records the District Court
and [the Sixth Circuit] have relied upon in reaching [their] decisions."1 0 1
The court reminded litigants and lower courts that the strong
presumption of public access imposed a "heavy" burden on any party
seeking to seal judicial records. 102 Just as it had in In re Knoxville
News-Sentinel Co., 103 the court warned that "[o]nly the most compelling
reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records."1 0 4 Shane Group
did nothing to modify the two established justifications for limiting
public access to live court proceedings: first, to maintain "order and
dignity in the courtroom" and, second, to limit "the content of the
information to be disclosed to the public" in order to protect "certain
privacy rights of participants or third parties, trade secrets, and
national security."1 0 5 Courts typically analyze seals through the second
category involving "privacy rights[,] . . . trade secrets, and national

security," 106 but when a court publishes documents to the world that it
would not publish to a jury or publishes documents after agreeing to
keep them under seal, that may also implicate concerns for order and
dignity of the court and the proceedings.

B. ProceduralMechanisms Defaulting Toward Disclosure
Shane Group's major change to the law of judicial seals in the
Sixth Circuit was procedural. Prior to Shane Group, an order sealing
judicial records might simply rely on a party's designation of the
document as "CONFIDENTIAL" during discovery. 107 Shane Group
requires more.10 8 The Sixth Circuit imposed a granular US Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit procedure requiring that the

100.
See Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 305 (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C.,
710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983)).
101.
Id. at 305 (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1179, 1181).
102.
Id.
103.
See In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983).
104.
Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 306 (quoting In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d at
476).
105.
Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 305-06; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1179.
106.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1179.
107.
Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 305.
108.
See id. at 305-06.
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"proponent of sealing"-who might be either the party filing the
document, another litigant, or even a subpoenaed third party-"analyze
in detail, document by document, the propriety of secrecy, providing
reasons and legal citations." 109 The Sixth Circuit imposed a parallel
burden on the district court to "set forth findings and conclusions'which
justify nondisclosure to the public,"' 110 presumably at a similarly
granular level. Following Shane Group, "[a] court's failure to set forth
those findings and conclusions 'is itself grounds to vacate an order to
seal."'1 1 1
The Sixth Circuit reinforced the new requirement in a series of
decisions following Shane Group.112 Although Shane Group came up as
a direct challenge to the seals themselves, it sparked renewed scrutiny
of sealed filings across the circuit. 113 After Shane Group, the Sixth

Circuit demonstrated in Beauchamp v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corp. that it was still willing to vacate seals on its own motion, just as

it had in Brown & Williamson. 114 Next, in Rudd Equipment Co., Inc. v.
John Deere Construction & Forestry Co.,115 the court held that an order

Id. at 305-06 (quoting Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir.
109.
2002)).
Id. at 306 (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1176).
110.
Beauchamp v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 658 F. App'x 202, 207 (6th Cir. 2016)
111.
(quoting Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 306).
See Kondash v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 2019 WL 1418168, at *2-*4 (6th Cir. 2019)
112.
(exploring distinctions between trade secret status and eligibility for seal); Woods v. U.S.D.E.A.,
895 F.3d 891, 893 (6th Cir. 2018); Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC v. Doe, 876 F.3d 831, 836-37 (6th
Cir. 2017) (extending Shane Group to develop a new standard for balancing privacy interests of
anonymous defendant liable for copyright infringement); Danley v. Encore Capital Grp., 680 F.
App'x 394, 399 (6th Cir. 2017) (emphasizing independent obligation of district courts); Rudd Equip.
Co., Inc. v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co., 834 F.3d 593, 592-94 (6th Cir. 2016) (applying
collateral order doctrine to vacate seal on interlocutory appeal); Beauchamp, 658 F. App'x at 207
(vacating seals sua sponte).
See Tyson v. Regency Nursing, LLC, No. 3:17-CV-91, 2018 WL 632063, at *1 (W.D.
113.
Ky. Jan. 30, 2018) ("The public has a strong interest in viewing the evidence that courts base their
decisions upon, even if that evidence could be deemed privileged or protected."); Knight Capital
Partners Corp. v. Henkel Ag & Co., KGaA, 290 F. Supp. 3d. 681, 687 (E.D. Mich. 2017) ("Henkel's
proposal for an automatic sealing provision in the protective order, therefore, is entirely out of the
question."); Doe v. Sevier Cnty., No. 3:17-CV-41, 2017 WL 1048378, at *3--*4 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 15,
2017) (denying motion to seal educational records because proponent failed to analyze exceptions
to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, or propose line-byline redactions); Alyn v. S. Land Co., LLC, No. 3:15-cv-596, 2016 WL 5126735, at *3 (M.D. Tenn.
Sept. 20, 2016) (denying motion to stay pending appeal of denial of motion to seal); "); In re Black
Diamond Mining Co., LLC, No. 15-96-ART, 2016 WL 4433356, at *4-*5 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 18, 2016)
(unsealing previously protected records); Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Reliable Transp.
Specialists, Inc., No. 15-12954, 2016 WL 6638698, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 13, 2016) ("Like all
plaintiffs, Wausau must accept the disclosure of otherwise private information and the risks that
are consequent to having filed a lawsuit. Its motion for a protective order is DENIED").
See Beauchamp, 658 F. App'x at 207; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at
114.
1176.
See Rudd, 834 F.3d at 592.
115.
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to seal judicial documents was a collateral order subject to immediate
appeal without awaiting final judgment in the district court. 116
The Shane Group line of cases redirected the path of least
resistance for any sensitive document in Sixth Circuit litigation. Prior
to Shane Group, that sensitive document would likely have been
produced under a "CONFIDENTIAL" or "ATTORNEYS EYES ONLY'
designation supported by a protective order issued for "good cause."11 7
If either party chose to present that document to the court for any
reason, it would be filed under seal using "perfunctory" motions and
orders citing the blanket protective order without applying "the vastly
more demanding standards for sealing off judicial records from public
view." 18 That unopposed motion to seal would likely have been granted
with limited scrutiny.' 19 Shane Group called attention to this problem
of "conflating the standards for entering a protective order under Rule
26 with the vastly more demanding standards for sealing off judicial
records from public view," but responded in a way that deprived the
district courts and litigants of some of the protections and discretion
afforded by Rule 26.120 After Shane Group, the same perfunctory order
might be vacated sua sponte at any time-during litigation or even after
litigation ended.121 The perfunctory motion-if presented to a judge
familiar with Shane Group-would be denied.1 22 The "proponent of the
seal" would be "free . . . to demonstrate-on a document-by-document,

line by line basis-that specific information in the [documents] meets
the demanding requirements for a seal."1 2 3 But "free" is the wrong word
to describe the painstaking analysis Shane Group compelsparticularly in a circuit where years of "perfunctory" orders leave few
robust opinions balancing the privacy interests implicated in modern
litigation against historical standards for open courts. A proponent of
sealing surprised by the filing, overburdened by responding to the
substance of the filing, or simply unable to muster nonexistent legal
authority to creatively justify the requested seal with line-by-line
briefing would lose that secret to the public record. Moreover, because

116.
Id.
117.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1); see also Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich.,
825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016).
118.
Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 307; accord United States v. Carell, No. 3:09-00445, 2011 WL
1114242, at *3 & n.2 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2011).
119.
Compare Carell, 2011 WL 1114242, at *1, *3 & n.2, with Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Bankers Tr. Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996).
120.
Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 307.
121.
See id.; Beauchamp, 658 F. App'x at 207.
122.
See, e.g., Gist v. TVA Bd. of Dirs., No. 1-14-CV-174-TRM-CHS, 2017 WL 3634017, at
*1 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 23, 2017).
123.
Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 308.
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"[a] court's obligation to keep its records open for public inspection is
124 even sealed
not conditioned on an objection from anybody,"
documents in cases finalized long ago may not be safe from Shane
Group.
C. Defaults on Promises of Confidentiality
Parties who begin litigation after Shane Group walk into that
forced disclosure knowingly, but parties who litigated a case or even
exchanged discovery in reliance on a protective order guaranteeing
sealed filings occupy a different position. Although the technical details
of protective orders vary, parties who accept others' confidential
information on the condition that it will only be filed under seal have
some obligation to protect that information. A similar duty reaches
district courts that sign and file agreed orders contemplating seals and
compel production of confidential information on the basis of those
protective orders. Unsealing documents, denying motions to seal that
would have been granted before Shane Group, and even filing
confidential documents knowing that they will be published default on
commitments parties relied upon when they made that information
available to the litigation.
Prior to Shane Group, protective orders described the process of
placing confidential discovery into the electronic record in different
Some orders ignored procedure, specifying only that the
ways.
125
Others mandated that
designated material would be filed under seal.
the party filing the documents would move to have the documents
sealed 26 or-more problematically after Shane Group-take all
necessary steps to have the documents filed under seal. Still others
Id. at 307.
124.
See Protective Order at 5-6, Danley v. Encore Capital Grp., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-11535125.
GCS-EAS (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2016), ECF No. 37 ("To the extent that any answers to
interrogatories, transcripts of depositions, responses to requests for admissions, or any other
papers filed or to be filed with the Court reveal or tend to reveal information claimed to be
confidential pursuant to the above terms, these papers or any portion thereof must be filed under
seal by the filing party with the Clerk of Court. However, no document may be filed under seal
without leave of court."); Agreed Protective Order at 5-6, Beauchamp v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg.
Corp., No. 2:13-cv-53-JGW (E.D. Ky. Feb. 19, 2015), ECF No. 72 ("[A]11 CONFIDENTIAL material
and all pages of any briefs, memoranda, affidavits, transcripts, exhibits, and other papers
containing notes or summaries of material which has been designated as CONFIDENTIAL
pursuant to this Protective Order which are presented to the Court shall be sealed . . . .").
See, e.g., Stipulated Protective Order Concerning Confidentiality at 8, Shane Grp., Inc.
126.
Blue Shield of Mich., No. 2:10-cv-14360-DPH-MKM (E.D. Mich. Oct. 5, 2011) ("If any
Cross
Blue
v.
documents or testimony designated or treated under this Order as Confidential Information is
included in any pleading, motion, exhibit, or other paper to be filed with the Court, the Party
seeking to use such material shall follow the procedures set forth in E.D. Mich. LR 5.3 and 26.4.
Nothing in this Order shall restrict any person, including any member of the public, from
challenging the filing of any Confidential Information material under seal.").
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indicated that the court "shall" place the documents under seal. 12 7
Regardless of the particular language used, each of these orders
memorialized and committed to a shared expectation that private
information shared with adversaries would not be shared with the
public. These expectations were not uncommon, even if they were
inconsistent with established law. 128
The particular phrasing of a protective order may determine
whether a party who files an adversary's confidential information after
Shane Group or the court that denies a motion to seal it has complied
with a pre-Shane Group protective order.
Compliance may be
impossible, for example, where the protective order compels a litigant
to "take all steps necessary" to place material under seal or indicates
that a court "shall" or "will" place the material under seal. That simply
cannot happen for many "CONFIDENTIAL" documents after Shane
Group. It may be ineffectual, as when a party must move to seal
documents but has no incentive to draft a meritorious Shane Groupcompliant argument, even when one exists. Either way, the result for
the party that produced confidential information is unexpected and
unfairly prejudicial. Either the private information becomes public, the
producing party bears the costs of arguing, "line-by-line," 1 2 9 to seal the
documents, or both-the producing party attempts and fails to place
valuable personal or commercial information under seals that Shane
Group does not permit.
IV. DECOUPLING DISCOVERY AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Although treating the electronic docket like an open courtroom
is problematic, treating it like the entire physical courthouse may
actually help reduce the overdisclosure of private information. To the

127.
See, e.g., Signature Mgmt. Team LLC v. Doe, No. 4:13-cv-14005 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 13,
2014) ("Any Confidential or Highly Confidential Information including deposition transcripts, as
well as briefs and other papers containing or otherwise disclosing such information, which is filed
with or otherwise submitted to any court shall be filed under seal. This Order shall be deemed to
permit the filing under seal of the deposition transcript, brief, or other paper containing the
Confidential or Highly Confidential Information.").
128.
See, e.g., United States v. Carell, No. 3:09-00445, 2011 WL 1114242, at *3 (M.D. Tenn.
Mar. 24, 2011) ("The parties in cases often draft proposed joint Protective Orders that violate the
requirements of Procter& Gamble and Brown & Williamson, and it appears that many attorneys
are unfamiliar with the principles set forth in these two cases.); see also id. at *3 n.2.
129.
Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 308 ("In any event, the parties or the third parties themselves
remain free on remand to demonstrate-on a document-by-document, line-by-line basis-that
specific information in the court record meets the demanding requirements for a seal."). The "lineby-line" language demands some combination of precise redactions and comprehensive
justifications. Either is time consuming and potentially prohibitively expensive, particularly when
applied to documents prepared and originally filed in reliance on a pre-Shane Group protective
order that promised to place those documents under seal.
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extent that the electronic material tracks evidence and arguments that
would take place in full public view, that material should remain
available in its electronic form. But the same concerns that justify incamera review of privileged or otherwise inadmissible documents and
judicial determinations of admissibility beyond bare assertions of
relevance invite a broader range of default procedures and remedies
than Shane Group implements. The full range of values addressed
above suggests that disputes over discovery and admissibility of
evidence should usually take place out of public view and that some
private information that cannot be sealed after Shane Group should not
be allowed in merits briefing at all.
A. Threshold Between Discovery and Merits Adjudication
The language and logic of Shane Group properly focuses on "the
adjudication stage" when "material enters the judicial record" and
cautions against "conflat[ing]" the standards for protective orders with
those for sealing judicial records. 130 Those thresholds are distinct,
though somewhat underdeveloped in the Sixth Circuit's pre-Shane
Group precedent. 13 1 Distinctions between merits adjudication and
Id. at 307 ("Here again we see the standards for protective orders and sealing
130.
conflated: that a mere protective order restricts access to discovery materials is not reason enough,
as shown above, to seal from public view materials that the parties have chosen to place in the
court record.").
A cursory review of the other circuits illustrates the variety and nuance of standards
131.
for balancing public scrutiny and litigants' privacy. See, e.g., Vantage Health Plan, Inc. v. WillisKnighton Med. Ctr., 913 F.3d 443, 450 (5th Cir. 2019) ("[I]n this circuit the decision to seal or
unseal records is to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis . . . and the individualized decision is best
left to the sound discretion of the district court." (citations omitted)); Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability
Oversight Council, 865 F.3d 661, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (describing a "six-factor test to balance the
interests presented by a given case"); Suture Express, Inc. v. Owens & Minor Distrib., Inc., 851
F.3d 1029, 1047 (10th Cir. 2017) (permitting sealing of a joint appendix because it "contain[ed]
confidential documents, financial information, and contracts, the confidential nature of which
outweighs the public's right of access"); N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. United States, 836 F.3d 421,
435 (3d Cir. 2016) ("[T]here is a presumptive right to public access to all material filed in
connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions, whether these motions are case dispositive or not,
but no such right as to discovery motions and their supporting documents." (citing Leucadia, Inc.
v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 1993))); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler
Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016) ("[P]ublic access will turn on whether the motion
is more than tangentially related to the merits of a case."); United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47,
54 (1st Cir. 2013) (distinguishing between "materials on which a court relies in determining the
litigants' substantive rights" and those that "relate[] merely to the judge's role in management of
the trial" and therefore "play no role in the adjudication process" when considering whether a
common law right of access applies (quoting F.T.C. v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404,
408 (1st Cir. 1987)); Goesel v. Boley Int'l. (H.K.) Ltd., 738 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2013)
("Documents that affect the disposition of federal litigation are presumptively open to public
view.. . to enable interested members of the public, including lawyers, journalists, and
government officials, to know who's using the courts, to understand judicial decisions, and to
monitor the judiciary's performance of its duties. (internal citations omitted)); IDT Corp. v. eBay,
709 F.3d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 2013) ("Modern cases on the common-law right of access say that
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secondary adjudications of discovery or evidentiary matters and the
larger distinction between merits adjudication and the broader judicial
record should inform decisions to publishing, sealing, or excluding
potentially relevant private information. 132 For example, documents
filed under seal are literally in the judicial record in a way that
documents emailed to chambers or physically delivered for in-camera
review are not. Different statutory requirements may add significance
to that distinction, 133 but it makes no normative difference in
considering whether public access is necessary or proper as a policy
matter.
Likewise, courts adjudicate discovery and admissibility
disputes, but those largely discretionary discovery and evidentiary
management decisions are both secondary to and distinct from merits
determinations. Moreover, these secondary adjudications also focus on
potentially irrelevant information and information carrying significant
risks of embarrassment, harassment, or undue prejudice to a party,
including information whose disclosure may improperly impact a
jury. 134 As long as the courts that adjudicate the merits of cases and
controversies also decide what information is relevant and necessary
for deciding those merits, judicial records will include private
information that is irrelevant and unnecessary.
Forcing public
disclosure because a court received that information and judged it to be
inadmissiblefor whatever reason also would wrongly "conflate[]" 135 the
relevant standards as surely as the overly aggressive sealing in Shane

'the weight to be given the presumption of access must be governed by the role of the material at
issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to
those monitoring the federal courts."' (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d
Cir. 1995))); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006) ("The weight
to be given the presumption of access must be governed by the role of the material at issue in the
exercise of Article III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those
monitoring the federal courts. Generally, the information will fall somewhere on a continuum from
matters that directly affect an adjudication to matters that come within a court's purview solely
to insure their irrelevance." (quoting Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1049)); Chi. Tribune Co. v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001) ("The better rule is
that material filed with discovery motions is not subject to the common-law right of access,
whereas discovery material filed in connection with pretrial motions that require judicial
resolution of the merits is subject to the common-law right, and we so hold."); Stone v. Univ. of Md.
Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180-81 (4th Cir. 1988) (describing "different levels of protection"
and "competing interests [that] must be weighed" when a district court considers sealing judicial
records). The Federal Circuit "appl[ies] the law of the regional circuit in which the district court
sits" when deciding challenges to judicial seals. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 727 F.3d 1214,
1220 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
132.
See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, 263 F.3d at 1312.
133.
See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-403 (2018); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 34(2)(b)(iii), (c)(iv)-(v)
(2017).
134.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
135.
Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 307.
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Group did. Rather than publishing, sealing, or perhaps excluding
documents based on broad definitions of "the judicial record" or
"adjudication," courts should apply the traditional values that make
publication, sealing, or exclusion appropriate for different material in
different contexts.
Documents and other materials that a court or jury uses to
decide the merits of a dispute go to the core of Brown & Williamson and
traditional notions of public courts. 136 Absent countervailing concerns
for national security, trade secrets, or other core privacy values,
material that a court needs or uses to resolve a dispute should be
available to public observers interested in critiquing or simply
understanding the court's work.
On the other extreme, irrelevant or unduly prejudicial private
information is exponentially more damaging on an open electronic
docket than it would be in an open courtroom. A party should be able
to move to exclude such material from trial without simultaneously
publishing it to the world by placing it into "the judicial record" and
asking for an "adjudication" on the evidentiary question. Similarly, a
party resisting the production of a certain category of documents in
discovery should be able to present the material to the court to help
explain why the court should "issue an order to protect [the] party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
or expense" without automatically disclosing the same information to
the world and suffering the harms Rule 26(c) prevents. 13 7
One implication of a more complete mapping of core values onto
electronic dockets is that all exhibits and most briefing on discovery and
evidentiary disputes could be sealed without noticeably undermining
public interests or judicial efficiency. This is a natural extension of
Shane Group's acknowledgement that "[s]ecrecy is fine at the discovery
stage" 138 and district judges' and magistrate judges' traditional
responsibility and discretion to resolve intractable discovery and
evidentiary disputes. No core values require discovery or evidentiary

See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983);
136.
Doe by Doe v. Brentwood Acad. Inc., No. M2018-02059-COA-R9-CV, 2018 WL 6600250, at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018) (adopting a modified Shane Group approach emphasizing actual
use of information by the court). The Tennessee court cites Shane Group approvingly, but it takes
a more exacting look not only at whether the medical information was confidential-it was-but
also at whether the courts relied on the information in a way that would otherwise justify
disclosure. The Tennessee court held that "if the information is both confidential and was not relied
on by the court to make a judicial decision, then the public's right to such information is greatly
diminished." Brentwood Acad. Inc., 2018 WL 6600250, at *4.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
137.
Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 305.
138.
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disputes to occur in full public view, 139 nor are judges' chambers open to
allow the public to observe in-camera review of privileged or otherwise
inadmissible documents.
Instead, public orders describing and
resolving the disputes would provide enough information for the public
and future litigants to understand the law, and the sealed filings would
remain available for any appellate review. Any documents important
enough to come back to the court during the adjudication of the merits
would find their way into the judicial record in a publishable form
during substantive briefing or at trial.
B. True Confidentiality in Discovery
While the Sixth Circuit "vacate[d] all of [the district court's]
orders sealing documents" in Shane Group and remanded for further
proceedings on the merits, 140 nothing prevents a court from vacating the
merits decisions relying on improperly sealed documents and
remanding for further proceedings with properly filed evidence. The
Sixth Circuit was correct that the old practice wrongly conflated
standards governing secrecy in discovery and during adjudication, but
so does Shane Group. If "[s]ecrecy is fine at the discovery stage, before
the material enters the judicial record" 14 1 but "very different
considerations apply" at the adjudication stage, 142 the question
remains: What should we do with the secrets disclosed in discovery that
cannot be protected in the public court filings?
Private documents disclosed in reliance on promises that those
documents would not be published should remain private until the
proponent of public disclosure can satisfy the proportionality standards
of Rule 26(b)(1). It is unfair to penalize a litigant for complying with
discovery obligations deemed proportional when confidentiality was
available by depriving them of the opportunity to argue that public
disclosure imposes an undue burden. And nothing prevents a court
from specifying that parties may reveal sensitive information to each
other for purposes of discovery without allowing that information to be
revealed to the public or the court. 143 Such an order would be entirely
consistent with the broad mandate of Rule 26(c)(1) to avoid

139.
But see Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing
Public Access to Information Generated through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 436 (2006)
(advocating broader access to unfiled discovery).
140.
Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 311.
141.
Id. at 305 (quoting Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2002)).
142.
Id. (quoting Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982)).
143.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
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"embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," factors that
44
reach well beyond the narrow standards for judicial seals.1
Shane Group poses particular problems for sensitive commercial
information that falls short of a trade secret. This includes relevant
information that a party will grudgingly disclose to resolve fact disputes
in litigation but would not willingly publish. It also includes irrelevant
information that would be too expensive, too difficult, or too confusing
to redact or filter from relevant content. The overbroad pre-Shane
Group sealing orders managed these concerns by encouraging litigants
to voluntarily disclose this borderline material under a "confidential"
designation and allowing courts to compel production under similar
circumstances. Unfortunately, as Shane Group demonstrates, that
approach invited overuse of judicial seals by eliminating any
adversarial assessment of whether private information was secret
enough to deserve a seal. The easy availability of a judicial seal
similarly prevented courts and litigants from considering whether
private information was relevant enough to be proffered as evidence or
even produced in discovery.
The Shane Group approach exposes the secrets and leaves the
documents in the record, but the opposite approach-protectingthe
secrets and striking the unsealable documents-is equally consistent
with the public nature of the courts and is more consistent with the
other values addressed above. Faced with a judgment based on
documents that cannot be placed in the public record, a court might
instead vacate the judgment and remand for proceedings relying on
public evidence. Allowing litigants to exchange confidential documents
that presumptively cannot be filed in the public court records still gives
litigants tools for collaborating and managing pretrial litigation
efficiently and with minimal costs.

14 5

It respects litigants and third

parties' privacy interests that extend beyond the authority of courts to
seal their own records.1 46 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it
creates an extra opportunity to engage in a proportionality analysis and
further narrow the scope of litigation just before the adjudication stage.
Vacating seals enforces the high common law standard for
judicial seals; however, it fails to consider whether the district court

144.

Id.
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.432 (FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 2004)
("When the volume of potentially protected materials is large, an umbrella order will expedite
production, reduce costs, and avoid the burden on the court of document-by-document
adjudication.").
See Eltis, supra note 20, at 315 ("[I]t may be that safeguarding privacy can become a
146.
way towards ensuring access to justice and willingness to participate in light of the challenges of
the Internet age.").
145.
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would have been willing to receive those documents or compel their
production without the option of placing them under seal. Having
determined that private information cannot remain in the public
adjudicative record under seal, it fails to consider whether those
documents belong in the adjudicative record at all. Certainly many of
the sealed documents were necessary and appropriate for the
adjudication, but when a protective order avoided "annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense" by ensuring
that certain documents could only be filed under seal, there is no
guarantee that the parties or the district court would have agreed to
share or use cumulative or marginally relevant documents whose
publication would embarrass, oppress, or impose undue burdens or
expenses on the litigants or third parties. 147
Shane Group's warning against conflating standards is well
taken, but conflating the standards in the opposite direction to
eviscerate Rule 26 and other rules safeguarding private information is
also inappropriate. The argument for applying the relevant standard
at each stage in litigation is equally persuasive when considering how
to preserve the Rule 26 standard for protective orders-a standard that
gives litigants and district courts broad latitude to manage discovery
and the presentation of evidence. Rule 26(c) reaches beyond trade
secrets to protect "other confidential research, development, or
commercial information."14 8 It reaches beyond national security to
protect litigants and third parties from "embarrassment," "annoyance,"
and "expense" disproportionate to the needs of the litigation. 149 It
allows courts and litigants to prescribe other methods for disclosing
information,1o place the contents of discovery under seal, 15 1 or outright
"forbidH the disclosure or discovery." 152 Those tools are sufficient to
protect private information from disclosure that would oppress or
embarrass but not threaten national security. If applied thoughtfully,
those same tools can increase the likelihood of a "just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination"153 in appropriate cases.

147.
See Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1316 (11th Cir.
2001) (Black, J., concurring) ("I write separately to express my concern about third parties-who
have no cause of action before the court-using the discovery process as a means to unearth
documents to which they otherwise would have no right to inspect and copy.").
148.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G).
149.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
150.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(C).
151.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(F).
152.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(A).
153.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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C. Litigating the Threshold Between Discovery and Merits
Adjudication
One option for retaining the relatively expansive exchange of
information in discovery without oversealing judicial records is to delay
final proportionality analyses until a party intends to place discovery
material into the public record. This allows initial proportionality
analyses to focus only on the costs of gathering, reviewing, and
disclosing information to the parties involved in the litigation, costs
that will be lower than those associated with broader disclosure and
more easily managed through the court's authority over parties. The
result would be disclosure and expenditures tailored to the actual risks
and needs of confidential discovery.
This second stage of proportionality analyses would precede
dispositive motions and other fact-intensive merits briefing and would
focus only on material deemed relevant by one party and private by
another. Just as parties now exchange proposed exhibits ahead of trial,
they could exchange exhibits shortly before filing summary judgment
briefing. This would allow the parties-and when necessary, the
court-to consider the costs and other risks of using specific confidential
documents and provide opportunities and incentives to explore
alternatives, including redaction, stipulations, or
reasonable
substitutions. It would not only protect private information, it would
also streamline summary judgment by eliminating the incentive and
154
the ability to "dump it all in and let the courts sort it out."
Mirroring the contemporary approach to discovery and
evidentiary disputes, courts could expect litigants to work through most
of those issues without direct court involvement. Drawing on modern
proportionality analyses and traditional evidentiary analyses, the
proponent of filing would bear the burden of showing relevance and
need,1 5 5 and the party with the privacy concerns would have the burden
of showing harm from disclosure as well as the opportunity to offer
options for altering the documents or satisfying the other party's
evidentiary needs in other ways. Of course, where Shane Group could
be satisfied, the parties might move to seal trade secrets or other
qualifying private information-preferably early in the litigation to
educate the court and the parties on the issues and define the limits of

This approach directly conflicts with the current approach, facilitated by pre-Shane
154.
Group practices of "dump [ing] it all in and let[ting] the courts sort it out." Ardia, supra note 3, at
1443.
See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (highlighting the virtue of
155.
means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information"); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
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the information necessary for adjudication but still inappropriate for
public disclosure. Where the privacy concerns involve information
coincidentally attached to relevant information, those documents could
be redacted or replaced with cleaner sources of the relevant information
with costs borne by either party. Where redactions would be confusing
or cost prohibitive, other documents are unavailable, and the facts are
essentially uncontested, the parties might agree to stipulate as to those
facts.
Some disputes would still reach the courts, just as some
discovery and evidentiary disputes do now, but courts are already well
equipped to balance Rule 26 concerns and related rules of evidence
before allowing secret discovery documents to pass the threshold into
public merits adjudication. Magistrate judges and district court judges
already have the expertise and discretion needed to encourage or
dictate reasonable compromises and discourage gamesmanship. Done
well, this might also narrow and simplify factual disputes ahead of trial
and improve the chances of rational settlements reflecting the merits of
the dispute rather than tangential risks and leverage involved with
highly sensitive, marginally relevant private information in public
litigation.
V. CONCLUSION

"[T]he
open
courtroom
has been"-and
remains-"a
fundamental feature of the American judicial system,"15 6 but "the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding" 15 7 requires courts to respect private information. Shane
Group and similar cases highlight the perils of casual secrecy that
undermine public confidence in the court, but we must also preserve the
rights and confidences of the parties that submit their controversies
and their secrets to the courts for justice. The electronic docket is as
much the modern heir to in-camera review and bench conferences as it
is an extension of the open courtroom. Judges responsible for keeping
the public entries open to the public are equally charged with
maintaining "order and dignity" 15 8 in those records to protect the
parties and the integrity of the proceedings. Courts and litigants should
work together with the same rules and norms that currently screen
irrelevant or prejudicial information from jury trials to similarly focus
public access and private decision making on the facts and evidence
156.
157.
158.
Cross Blue

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983).
FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1179; see also Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue
Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305-06 (6th Cir. 2016).
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essential to the merits of the cases and controversies that courts exist
to address.

